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INTRODUCTION
a. Methodological Concerns
This paper, which seeks to understand youths' own justifications for engaging in acts of
collective violence, is based on a case study of activist youth and their organisations in
Diepkloof, Soweto.1 The research was conducted during the period 1991 - 1993. While the
specificities and peculiarities of any particular area make generalisations difficult, many of
the conditions under which Diepkloof youth live, as well as their experiences, are probably
very similar to those of youth in other townships in Soweto, the Gauteng province, and
indeed, South Africa. Consequently, while the research claims to give insight into the
consciousness of activist youth in Diepkloof, some of these findings may be applicable to
youth in other townships.
The objective of this work informed its methodological motivations. The underlying premise
was that collective and violent action, as well as the emergence of social movements, cannot
be read off from the structural context, nor from assumed psychological states of "relative
deprivation". As a result, a phenomenological approach was pursued. Youth were thereby
able to articulate for themselves their life experiences; their understanding of the world
around them; and how these subjectivities give rise to a set of ideas about appropriate
strategies for dealing with conflict and effecting change in their society. To gain insight into
these youths "point of view" and understand the day-to-day experiences that inform this view,
two key qualitative research methods were chosen: participant observation and intensive
interviews.
Since the youth who are the focus of this study were essentially part of political youth
organisations, it was important to try to understand how these organisations operated as part
of a broader social movement; who participated n these organisations; and how and in what
way they served to facilitate the creation of particular identities of the participants. As a
result, I became a participant in the ANC Youth League in Diepkloof; this was done with the
encouragement and approval of the executive of this organisation. Essentially, this involved
attending general meetings which took place every fortnight on a Tuesday evening.2
A second arena of participation was in the family lives of these young people. This was
necessary since much of their lives were spent at home with their families; many of the
interviews took place in their homes, and it was important to meet with other family
members. Furthermore, the youth were keen for me to become acquainted with their
families, and this participation was hence part of developing trusting relationships with the
youth and members of the community generally. This entailed having tea and meals with
family members, and attending such occasions such as weddings. Thirdly, it was important
to participate in township life more broadly. This involved spending time walking around
the township, going to shops, participating in group discussions, and attending funerals and
memorial services. This was necessary not only from an academic point of view, but it also
became a way of ensuring my personal safety in the township.
While it is true that such a research method raises many questions as to the objectivity of the
researcher, the use of participant observation was invaluable to this research. This was
particularly the case since without gaining trust through being a friend and "comrade", it
would have been unlikely that responses to politically sensitive and personally painful issues
would have been given.
Thirty intensive interviews, each averaging about three hours, were carried out with youth
from both the Congress of South African Students (Cosas) and the ANC Youth League3 in
the area. The youth interviewed reflected the make-up of the organisations concerned. The
majority were unemployed and school-going youth; about twenty percent were female; there
were youth representatives from each zone in Diepkloof; and finally, there were "seasoned"
activists while others were new to these organisations. These youth came from working
class, broken families. Only two of these youth interviewed had obtained matric
certification; the majority had only some form of secondary education. Three of the youth
interviewed were employed in the formal sector; most spent their time either carrying out
activities related to these political organisations, or "hanging around" the township with
friends and comrades. Their ages ranged between fourteen and twenty eight years.4
b. Backdrop to the paper
Youth in Diepkloof who aligned themselves with the Charterist Movement5 in South Africa,
were engaged in a number of acts of "collective" or "political" violence6 during the period
from 1984-1993. They participated in acts of collective violence against what they perceived
to be "agents of the state" such as the police; local government councillors; and even teachers
and principals of schools in some instances. They also engaged in collective violence against
groups and individuals who were perceived as a threat to the communities in which they
lived. These included, for example, Inkatha, and individuals who were identified as "spies"
by these youth. In some instances, violence was also used against members within their own
organisations who were perceived as "undisciplined", or acting outside of a code of conduct
developed by the organisations of which these youth were members. Collective violence in
Diepkloof during the period 1984-1993 took a variety of forms. In some instances, people
were killed by these youth. For the most part, however, these youth made use of less severe
forms of violence such as beating, and other forms of physical punishment.
While, many may argue that violence of any sort is reprehensible, this paper, following the
work of Charles Tilly, has an underlying premise that collective violence is generally a form
of collective action. It is used as a last resort by actors of social movements who believe
their grievances have not, or cannot, be dealt with through other methods of collective action.
Collective violence, this paper contends, cannot be seen as separate from other forms of
collective action; it often arose when more peaceful forms of protest failed, and intensified
in response to the repressive actions of the state. Township youth have been the key
recipients of violent acts of the repressive state. However, they were not merely victims, but
also agents in struggle. The activist youth studied her, in their struggle against repression,
engaged in political violence as a perceived means of bringing about greater social justice.
Consequently, collective violence is not only purposive, but also rational.7
In order to understand the purposive nature of collective or political violence, some sense of
the actors own point of view is crucial. It is through examining the discourses used by the
youth, that this paper attempts to provide some insight into the various justifications that these
youth ascribed to their involvement in political violence. This paper examines the discourses8
surrounding "political violence"; it probes how youth represent political violence, with special
reference to its perceived "morality", and at how the construction of this discourse cannot
be separated from their self-conception of what it meant to be a "comrade". The actual
wording, expressions and assumptions that the comrade youth of Diepkloof make use of in
speaking about political violence will be central in this paper. This language is embedded
in a broader discourse which legitimates violent acts; it has several aspects to it and varying
degrees of adherence by the different strata of youth.
Language itself is an important tool for understanding consciousness. Through an
examination of language, insight can be developed as to how participants interpret, and
symbolise violence in their own minds. Therefore, an understanding of discourse or language
helps the understanding of legitimation9 which is the focus of this paper. Language not only
presents our feelings, but articulates our perceptions as well10; "language is the most
distinctive human activity, whereby, persons become conscious of their feelings".11
Additionally, experiences of and actual engagement in violent acts, tends to generate their
own discourse. Hence, the discourses that youth develop in relation to violence needs to be
contextaulised in their daily experiences of violence.12 This discourse, as we shall see, is a
combination of the "derived" ideas from official literature of the liberation movement, both
legal and illegal; statements of leaders and literature about liberation struggles in other
countries; and "inherent" ideas which emerge from the youth's own experiences and
understandings of the world, are shaped by their involvement as participants in struggle.
This discourse is both "political" and "moral" in content; it coincides with and contradicts
the ideology, and identity of the broader Charterist social movement during the period under
discussion.
5The youth interviewed, in justifying and understanding political violence, make use of a
number of key words and phrases. The word "target" refers to people and objects
"deserving" of physical attack. Other prevalent terms are those of "people's war" and
"ungovernability" which first became popular in the eighties during popular struggles against
the apartheid state. The interviewees also referred to "the community" which usually denoted
the residents of Diepkloof itself, but was sometimes as broad as African people in South
Africa. In speaking about their involvement in acts of political violence, the youth made
reference to themselves as "comrades", which for these youth signifies "moral defenders of
the community". Closely linked to the idea of being a "comrade" is that of being a "youth";
youth in their terms (derived largely from Sayco's definition of youth in its official
documentation) were "energetic", and "vigourous" and hence able to engage in a variety of
activities. Finally the notion of "correct" was used frequently; it referred to behaviour and
beliefs which were seen to be of high "moral" standing and was inextricably linked to the
"comrade" identity.
There were six main justifications given by the youth interviewed for their involvement in
political violence. Firstly, the youth perceived themselves as having responded in the mid-
eighties to the call of the ANC in taking up armed struggle as a strategy for change; this was
seen by many as still relevant in 1993 despite the changed political terrain of the early
nineties. Secondly, they believed that the root of the violence lay in the direct and structural
violence of the South African state, particularly the activities of the police. Thirdly, it was
believed that "real liberation" is not possible without bloodshed - within this perspective is
a very real mistrust of the negotiations process, and involves the continuation of repertoires
of speech carried over from the eighties into the nineties. Fourthly, it was viewed as logical
that youth, given their role as defenders of the community, and their prime position in the
liberation struggle, will and should be involved in acts of political violence. Fifthly, and
related to the second justification, it was believed that violence will speed up the process of
change.
Finally, the youth perceived themselves as holding the moral high-ground and maintaining
unity, or political hegemony, through the use of violence against those who were seen as
being outside of the morality of organised youth, or the liberation movement more broadly.
6All of these perceived justifications cannot easily be separated, but form part of a coherent
discourse that can be threaded together from the language of the Diepkloof youth. This paper
does not claim to provide a comprehensive analysis as to the causes of youth participation in
collective violence, rather it aims to explore these young peoples' own justifications through
their own language and discourses. The paper will also briefly examine some tentative
consequences of this discourse for the present and near future in South Africa.
A. RESPONDING TO THE CALL OF THE ANC
In the eighties the prime goal of the Diepkloof youth organisations (in particular Cosas and
the youth congress), along with UDF more broadly, was to end apartheid. It was understood
by the Charterist social movement that this was not going to occur simply by politicising
activists and the community. Organisations had to develop mass bases and take up action that
would challenge the very legitimacy and functional capacity of the state. While, this meant
the taking up of campaigns such as rent, school, and consumer boycotts, and calls for the
resignation of corrupt councillors, even more serious acts of civil disobedience were seen as
necessary to effect change, and to bring home to the government the immensity of the force
they were confronting. Cosas and the Youth Congress both identified strongly with the
ANC. According to Phillips13 this meant identification with the four pillars of struggle of the
ANC at the time. These included:
1. Building up and consolidating of internal structures;
2. Mobilising the masses around issues in order to increase political awareness and build
support;
3. International isolation and;
4. Stepping up military activities around MK.
Acts of violence against both property, and persons associated with the state became a logical
extension of these "pillars", reinforced by the call from the ANC in 1985 in exile to "make
the country ungovernable". The youth responded to this call willingly. Youth were
confronted with violence on a daily basis; had poor chances for educational advancement as
the schooling crisis deepened; and minimal chances of employment. Furthermore, township
7youth had to deal wit the constant and violent presence of the security forces and, even more
disturbingly for most youth, in the school grounds as well. "Smashing the apartheid state"
through whatever means available in the hope of greater democracy, equality, and
opportunities was welcomed as a potential path to freedom.
Diepkloof youth believed they were justified in taking up the ANC's call for ungovernability
in the mid-eighties. In the eighties, and even into the nineties, a tape with Tambo's opening
speech at Kabwe calling for "ungovernability" was circulated amongst activist youth in
Diepkloof.14 While Sayco and Cosas claimed to be "non-violent", they posited that the youth
were the "young lions" who "form the core of the 'political' and 'military* armies of the
revolution. Their youthful energy enables them to perform great feats in the theatre of
battles...".15 Youth in Diepkloof took up the role of "young lions":
We carried out violence against the state, not as Cosas members,
but as the youth of South Africa supporting the call of the ANC
(Thabo).
According to Thabo, many youth (obviously black) responded as "South Africans" to the call
of the ANC; these youth were not only those who were members of Charterist youth
organisations such as Cosas, but rather, according to Thabo, included the majority of
township youth.
However, the cultural repertoire of armed struggle outlived strategic reality. The ANC called
for a suspension of the armed struggle in 1990 when it entered into negotiations with the
state. In the early nineties, while there were many youth who believed that armed struggle
was still necessary, even the key pillar of struggle, there were those who believed that the
strategies, and tactics of the youth needed to be revised. A small proportion of these youth
(generally seasoned activists who had remained in organisations) believed that there had been
political changes and that political violence against the "regime" - "revolutionary violence"
- was no longer appropriate, and that other means towards political change needed to be given
priority. These differing views were reflected in a dialogue between two Diepkloof youth:
The youth have the same role today as in the 1980's. At that time
the ANC told us that we should make the country ungovernable.
So today I don't think that thing it is still the same precisely
because the government tyrants are ungovernable themselves. It
is the same problems as before (Sello).
You see this is a problem when we still have our own comrades
saying there is no change. But there are changes and because of
these changes we need to adapt a new style of working and
develop new targets and strategies...In the past we had to render
the state ungovernable...Now we need to start to think objectively
because of the changed conditions (Namedi).
The ideological divisions which emerged amongst organised youth in Diepkloof as a result
of the negotiations process in the nineties, gave rise to similar divisions in attitudes toward
political violence, particularly, "revolutionary violence". Youth such as Namedi (a seasoned
activist in the area) who were disciplined supporters of the ANC and were trying to carry out
the decisions made by the ANC, were generally the youth who were more prepared to
redefine the strategies and tactics of the youth in the "new era". It was these youth who,
while weary of the negotiations process, were trying to "think objectively because of the
changed conditions". Youth such as Namedi were at great pains to explain to others that
while social and economic change was not visible, the changes in the political arena were
significant, and should be accompanied by changed tactics and strategies in local political
organisations. However, as we shall see below, the majority of youth interviewed were angry
and frustrated with the negotiations process. Like Sello, they believed the state remained a
"tyrant" which was "ungovernable"; it was unable to govern the country and despite the
negotiations process, remained illegitimate. For Sello and others then, the ANC's strategy
of "ungovernability" remained as applicable in the early nineties as it was in the eighties.
B. THE OPPRESSIVE STATE
More than anything else, it was the violent nature of the security forces, and these youths'
direct experience of this violence that led them to seriously question non-violence as a viable
strategy:
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I can say the police contributed more to our youth being violent.
It's just like the handling of unrest situations, you see. I
remember there was a time in '86 there was a stayaway organised
by Bishop Tutu. So there we organised a march here in
Diepkloof. So without provocation our youth were shot, people
were arrested and people were brutally assaulted. So now the
culture of violence started there (Lumkile).
Lumkile asserts that it was not until the police began to use violence against township
residents who were protesting their conditions of life that violence came to be used as a tactic
by residents themselves. Peaceful marches, for example, became violent when police began
to shoot at youth. Police violence was compounded by the arrests of youth and other
"people". Furthermore, "people" (the youth in particular) were brutalised in the hands of
police - they were "assaulted", beaten, even killed. For Lumkile, it was this violence of the
police, in particular the "detention" of "comrades", that precipitated what he refers to as the
"culture of violence" amongst the youth. This understanding of why collective violence
emerged as a strategy for bringing about change, is in line with other research into South
Africa's resistance movement such as the work of Jeremy Seekings.16
There was also a sense amongst the youth interviewed that the police not only acted in
directly violent ways towards people; they also took from people what was perceived by these
youth as rightfully theirs. The notion of "rights" is common in youths' consciousness:
Violence comes from maybe the police themselves depriving
people of maybe their rights. At times they even harass people
like going to a funeral and all that (Chris).
Here the violent activities of the security forces, used to ensure the continued deprivation of
black South Africans, caused the violent response of black youth. The police, in particular,
once more were identified as the key perpetrators of violence. Through their actions of
physical violence, they denied township residents of their "rights" - their liberty to engage in
everyday life activities. The harassing of people going to a funeral (a "sacred" event) was
given as an example of a denial of basic human rights. The security forces were involved
in both direct violence, and in ensuring the continuation of more indirect, structuralviolence.
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While the violent actions of the security forces may have been the presenting problem, the
broader state itself, not surprisingly, was perceived negatively. The state was defined as the
"apartheid" or "racist" state - not, particularly, as a capitalist entity. It was seen as having
caused inequalities between the various racial groupings in South Africa - "this racist
government of apartheid has caused separation; racially, tribal and all that, and lack of
equalness between these groups" (Musi); as acting in a coercive manner - "things are
happening in South Africa that are not correct, but because of the sternness of the
government, and the ruling party, you know, they are prevailing" (Lumkile); as depriving
black people of their basic rights - "the worst thing about this government is that our people
have no right, having no vote, in fact have no say in whatever" (Nika); and finally, as
limiting the "African community" from developing socially, and economically - "this
apartheid government has disrupted most of my plans, especially for my future because maybe
today I must be something; like I could finish university or college. But due to apartheid,
most of my plans haven't hatched" (Thabo).
The inequalities of apartheid society, together with the coercion used by the security forces
to uphold the vast disparities amongst communities within South Africa, were at the root of
most of youths' understanding of the etiology of political violence:
There is violence in our society, especially toward the fascists
because the people are hungry for liberation (Lumko).
This respondent was reflecting on the sense of urgency which he felt existed in the
community. The underlying belief was that the community had been "starved" and needed
to be "replenished". It was the authoritarian, and prejudiced state which had led to the
current "starvation" and was, therefore, the rightful target of political violence.
The state was violent because it was illegitimate; it had not been chosen by the people which
it governed, and it used criminal means to maintain power:
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This government is not our government. So the killing will never
stop. Why? Because this government is a thug...So if the place
is ruled by thugs, the killing will never stop. In Russia there is no
crime. Why? Because the government was appointed by the
people (Zola).
Despite the obvious ideological naivety of this statement, what lies at the root of this quote
was an assumption that state representivity is a prerequisite for peace. The South African
state was seen as a "thug" - a bully who took from people what was rightfully theirs. The
criminal nature of the state gave rise to the need for it to be eliminated and replaced with one
which is morally defensible due to its representative nature. The state in Russia, by
comparison, was seen as "good" since for "Zola" it represented a "peoples' government".
Further justification for violence carried out by the youth was that they perceived themselves
as relatively deprived in comparison with others, obviously white South Africans, who were
at an advantage owing to their economic wealth:
South Africa is a violent society because you see there are people
who are enjoying privileges and there are people who are not
enjoying privileges, you see. So in fact at this present time of
course South Africa is a violent society due to what I have
stated...Others have not got their rights and culture. They have
been destroyed...So there can be no peace you see (Musi).
Musi indicates an understanding of class inequality in the society. This unequal "enjoyment"
of "privileges" was for Musi the basis of a violent society - the society was at base
structurally violent. The rights of poor, black people had been "destroyed" - they had been
demolished and no longer existed in any form. However, not only had "rights" been
destroyed, but poor people had also been deprived of their "culture" - their way of life and
all that was meaningful to them in their most everyday existence.
As a result of the violence of the security forces, non-violence came to be seen as an
inappropriate strategy for change:
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Comrades say now we are peaceful and those people [the police]
are fighting. So what's the use of being peaceful (Lumkile).
The assumption here was that when confronting an intensely violent state and its security
forces, violence as a retaliatory strategy was the only one which would lead to serious
attention by the state to the grievances, and demands of the oppressed. The "people" had to
"retaliate":
Then peoples retaliate because they just can't take the police
harassing them. So people themselves got fed up, then they
decided to retaliate...How they retaliate I can't exactly say, but
they will do any form of retaliation they can think of. They
might throw the police with stones and all that (Chris).
Political violence emerges when tolerance toward oppression and repression could no longer
be sustained; it was an act of "striking back" on the behalf of the community. Violence
carried out by the youth was an act of retribution and revenge and was hence seen to be
defensive rather than as offensive, and as justifiable in the face of the morally indefensible
actions of others.
Consequently, for Musi, quoted below, "peace" was not possible in South Africa until
inequality was eradicated through "fighting":
Violence will always be the order of the day because you see, we
Africans always fight to make sure we retain our right and our
culture (Musi).
"Africans" - those who are poor and have no "rights" and "culture" - had to "fight" or wage
a struggle to achieve rights which had been granted to others and denied the African
community. Acts of violence were also seen as important so as to regain dignity.
While political violence was seen to be a rational and purposive response of the youth, the
responsibility for political violence perpetrated by these youth was seen as lying with the
state. In so saying, the youth absolved themselves from responsibility since they were merely
responding to an "evil" that confronted them as township residents. The unintended
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consequence of this was that through their discourse, the youth deny themselves as actors
consciously acting to change structural inequality. This "denial" of responsibility and agency
was weaved throughout the youths' discourse and accounts of political violence.
Although it may appear that these youth are abdicating their own responsibility as agents in
the "cycle of violence" it is interesting to note that this understanding resonates with an
Althuserian approach which contends that the security forces in modern society are the
repressive agents of the state, and even a Weberian approach which argues that the state has
the monopoly over violence in modern societies.
C. BLOODSHED IS NECESSARY FOR LIBERATION
Straker, in attempting to find a psychological explanation for the involvement of youth in
political violence, concludes that "there was no evidence that participation in violence had a
healing or transforming effect at the individual level"17 as the work of Fanon suggests.
While, this may be so, a number of the Diepkloof youth interviewed clearly believed that
there could be no real liberation without violence and bloodshed:
Violence is needed in our country so that we can remove all the
bad things that are there. This present regime is like a sickness
that must be destroyed violently so that better things can exist and
the society can be more healthy. So violence is necessary..."
(Musi).
Violence has a "cleansing" effect since it represented the complete elimination of what was
perceived as evil and unsanitary. The apartheid state was likened to a "sickness" which if
not "destroyed" or annihilated, it was believed, would contaminate a new society which was
supposed to be "better" and "more healthy".
This need for violence, they asserted, was common to all "liberation struggles": the youth
were well aware of the histories of liberation in such places as Cuba, Nicaragua,
Mozambique, Namibia, and Angola:18
There is no easy road to freedom.19 What we are experiencing
right now is what Namibia also experienced before it was
liberated and all that. And then I will never be surprised if there
is a civil war maybe next year in South Africa (Chris).
14
The youth mentioned countries geographically close to home, or those emphasised by the
liberation struggle at large as "exemplary", particularly during the period of peoples war:
Then I will know that liberation is characterised by many things.
Bloodshed must be there so that the people must be liberated
(Chris).
For "Chris", "bloodshed" and liberation were inextricably linked.
While this may be frightening to conceive, the perception that violence or war was a
necessary part of transition, gave rise to a glorification of casualties on both sides. The loss
of life of someone associated with apartheid was seen as one step closer to liberation:
To kill a policeman is to mean we are closer to our freedom
because we are getting rid of some of the obstacles of our
struggle (Zola).
The loss of life of a "comrade", on the other hand, was an example of an exemplary soldier
or "freedom fighter" prepared to give up his/her life for the betterment of their country:
Many comrades, like Vuyani [a key youth activist in the area]
have died in our struggle for liberation. But these comrades are
true heroes and freedom fighters who have died because they
loved their country so much (Thandi).
"Death and sacrifice" indeed became a part of both the discourse and practice of political
violence.20
D. VIOLENCE AS NECESSARY FOR "REAL CHANGE"
A strong belief existed amongst the Diepkloof youth interviewed that without violence, change
would be incremental, and incomplete. While, these beliefs were rooted in the strategy of
"people's war" in the 1980's, they persisted in the early nineties, partly, as a result of a lack
of faith on behalf of youth in the negotiations process. The majority of youth interviewed
were sceptical of this process since they doubted the sincerity of the apartheid government:
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I think we are wasting our time in negotiations. Many times we
talk to De Klerk and he promise he will do this and this. Then
when the deadline comes, he doesn't do this thing (Thandeka).
The youth interviewed were particularly disconcerted by the ANC's decision to suspend the
armed struggle while people continued to be killed in the townships:
It was a blunder for the ANC to suspend the armed struggle
because of violence, the killing of our people (Thabo).
Even youth in Cosas and the Youth League who supported the process of negotiations, felt
frustrated and did not have faith in its capacity to remove apartheid:
...comrades have been patient trying to solve things through
negotiations...the comrades they try to compromise. But
practically we see there is a problem, practically (Sipho).
Furthermore, the state was still seen by the early nineties to be in control of the security
forces. As was the case in the eighties they continued to carry out acts of violence against
township residents. At the same time, the "masses" had no real defense against this "large"
repressive force. They had only "stones":
The state is still having its machinery which it uses against the
people. This state machinery is large and we still find the masses
fighting with stones (Sipho).
Since the state "machinery" remained intact, it appeared to this respondent that while the
"comrades" had compromised, the state remained in tact. Moreover, youth stated that "no
change has taken place within the location" (Xolile). While national negotiations were taking
place, this change was "not real because people are still suffering with poverty under this
government" (Thami). Indeed, during the early nineties, and arguably even after the national
elections in April 1994, there was no material improvement of the lives of township residents.
Most of these youth believed the only way to bring about "real change" (where the National
Party no longer has power and control, and people's material conditions are addressed) in the
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shortest time possible, was to violently "overthrow" the existing government. The lack of
any real experience of change since the negotiations process (aside from increased structural
unemployment) left the youth feeling their patience was running out and with a sense of
urgency:
The thing that will ultimately bring change is the overthrowment
of the regime. This is feasible since it is directly proportional to
our efforts...The structures do not yet exist for this, but we are
working toward this (Sello).
Sello is implying that while other forms of struggle existed (such as negotiations, and
international pressure), these were unimportant in their impact as compared with the potential
that armed struggle had for bringing about some sort of transition. The "apartheid" state was
in no way perceived as a negotiating partner, but as an institution which needed to be
vanquished. Furthermore, despite the fact that Sello admitted that organisational structures
were very weak in the early nineties, he believed that with more "exertion" and greater
organisation on behalf of the youth organisations, insurrection in South Africa was possible.
The assumption behind this is that there had been no "real change" in the nature of politics
from the eighties to the nineties.
The need to violently remove the state in order for change to be immediate and, before the
liberation movement completely compromised itself to its own detriment, was directly linked
to the perception that political violence was necessary to "cleanse" the society of all that was
bad, and evil. Straker similarly found that most youth "expressed themselves in favour of
violent change. This view was informed not only by their belief that real change was
impossible without violence, but also by more personal desires for revenge".21 There was a
definite desire amongst the Diepkloof youth interviewed for a more fundamental form of
change than seemed would be the outcome of negotiations.
E. YOUTH AS DEFENDERS OF THE COMMUNITY
What became clear through interacting with the youth concerned in Diepkloof was the
cardinal role that the identity of being a "comrade" played in respondents' understanding of
the role of political organisations and their motivations for becoming involved in "struggle".
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This self-identity was often created in their actual engagement in struggle. Another key
component of their identity was that they were "youth"; as the "bearers of the future", youth
believed themselves to be in the rightful position to lead the struggle toward a new and better
society:
We as the youth know that the future is in our hands because the
old men, Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo, will disappear because
they are old. Therefore the people who are going to be
responsible for the future South Africa will be the youth (Xolile).
Youth were aware that the older leadership were going to "disappear" i.e. get sick and die,
and the future would then lie in the hands of the younger generation. They had many hopes
for a "new and better" society. Firstly, they wanted peace - "Mostly, we want peace to be
there in a new South Africa" (Xolile). They hoped for democracy and economic wealth - "I
want a democratic South Africa with a high economy" (Thami). They wanted "a good
education with proper teachers and textbooks" (Zola). Finally, they wanted a "non racial"
South Africa - "We want to have a future based on the Freedom Charter where the most
important thing is to have non-racial ism "(Thabo).
Secondly, because youth saw themselves as "energetic", "flexible", "agile", and "adaptable",
they were positioned to "defend" the "community" against perceived outside dangers.22 These
"dangers" or threats included more than the actions of "the state". They also included, for
example, the activities of gangsters, and Inkatha. Activist youth in Diepkloof were in fact
the key agents responsible for hunting down well known gangsters in the area such as the
Kabasas who plagued Diepkloof in the late eighties, and the Jackrollers who were active in
Diepkloof in the early nineties. These gangsters were seen as dividing the community and
consequently reducing the capacity for a united struggle against a common enemy - the
apartheid state. Activist youth in Diepkloof were active in bringing about the demise of these
two major gangster formations. Police seem to have been very slow in responding to these
attacks, leading to suspicions of their collusion with such formations. Activist youths' role
in fighting these gang formations was applauded by residents of Diepkloof. In fact, these
youth were seen as being very different from gang formations which were causing havoc in
the community. As a Nicro social worker put it:
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The older people in the community appreciate youth in
organisation. They feel these youth make things change. This is
different from gang youth who they see as destroying the
community. The political youth try to avoid chaos because they
say this is tarnishing their image.23
These youths prime role in the "liberation struggle" which came to the fore in the eighties,
together with their perceived need to protect their families led to an almost functional
necessity for them to be engaged in political violence of a variety of forms:
You know a youth, if you tell a youth about violence like you
say, 'hey there's Inkatha coming in this direction', hey they never
going to stop to go there. Hey, they are leaving the school...they
saying they want to fight...they say they are going to defend our
masses (Bheki).
From the above quote, it seems that it was almost a spontaneous response for youth to move
towards sites of perceived danger. The youth played a role in shielding the "community",
and "our masses" from outside threat of any kind. As was stated earlier, the "community"
was used interchangeably with "our masses" and referred to the African community at large
in its more generalised sense, but could at times refer more specifically to the residents of
Diepkloof who the youth felt were their immediate "community".
Diepkloof was their geographical territory which they needed to protect. The "community"
was "good" - they were not part of Inkatha or gangster formations. Bheki implies that
"Inkatha" was seen as "outsiders", a threat - not part of the "community" that needed to be
protected. Their role as warriors was seen as far more important than that of their role as
school-goers. Youth stated that they found it difficult to remain in a classroom while there
were inauspicious activities happening on the streets outside. Straker accurately describes the
dissonance in the day-to-day lives of youth in the township which led conflictual response by
township youth. She states of the youth she interviewed that:
They were not conscripted soldiers within a conventional army
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fighting battles in a combat zone. Yet they were engaged in what
they saw as a civil war...At the same time, the youth were meant
to attend school as usual and to carry on their daily affairs.24
Despite the high rate of unemployment in Diepkloof, youth still perceived "adults" as parents
who had jobs, and were, therefore, outside of the township for a large percentage of the time:
The people who are experiencing the violence are the youth
because the youth are the ones who are in the location full time.
They can see everything that is happening, but their parents are
not there, they work. The youth must defend their properties
(Xolile).
The youth, who were by and large students or unemployed, perceived themselves as bounded
by the township. It became their role to hold the fort while "the parents" were away. The
youth were the "eyes" of "the community" - "they can see everything that is happening".
Without the vigilance and activities of the youth, the township would be without protection
against gangsters, or potential "enemies" such as Inkatha:
Youth is the one who is involved in political violence. While I
have just stated that youth is militant then I mean if you remain
as a resident of Diepkloof, then you can't just be doing nothing.
I can't accept that maybe Inkatha do attack us. Instead of
attacking us, then we will also avenge ourselves. Then the
parents they used to be sleeping, then the youth go and fight
(Chris).
Despite the high levels of unemployment at the time which affected both youth and their
parents, these young people believed that since their "parents worked during the day", the
youth worked at night. Adults were "passive"; youth were "militant" - they were combative,
and warlike. In the face of attack, from Inkatha or any other external threat, the youth could
not remain inactive. Political violence on behalf of the community was perceived to be
retaliatory, and provoked - the youth "avenge" themselves. Political violence was hence
necessary and reasoned.
F. COMRADES ARE THE ENSURERS OF DISCIPLINE, MORALITY
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AND DISCIPLINE
Youth who were engaged in the liberation struggle saw themselves not only as defending the
community in a physical sense. More broadly, they perceived themselves as defending the
"morality" of the township, and in so doing building unity or homogeneity. The youth tried
to preserve what was "good" in the township. By being "moral", one was expected not to
commit crimes against other members of the "community". Crimes such as theft, murder,
and rape caused suspicion, and fear and led to "disunity". Disunity was problematic in
"struggle" since in order to achieve a common "good", people had to work together with a
common goal of what was being fought for. Hence, the "community" needed to be
"cleansed" internally. This was necessary for the "liberationary project" of the youth to
achieve a democratic society free of oppression, and exploitation.25 Sayco defined the goal
of the "liberation movement" as a "struggle for...peoples freedom, social progress, and
peace".26
Members of organisations, and even more broadly, those who identified with the liberation
movement, were expected to act in a "disciplined" manner both within the organisation and
outside. "The comrades know what is the wrong and the right thing" (Themba). It was
therefore the role of the comrade youth to "show people the right way" (Senatso). More than
often, behaving in an "undisciplined" manner involved harming either an organisation or the
community in some way. This type of behaviour, they believed, would lead to loss of unity,
so needed during times of mass mobilisation. Consequently, in order for mass struggle to be
effective, communities needed to be consolidated against a common enemy. Moreover, the
oppositional force needed to be seen to be morally superior so as to be worth supporting.
"Showing the right way" could be done through a number of means - from simple
chastisement to physical punishment. This was dependant on the perceived level of
"immorality" of a person's behaviour:
When people do a wrong thing, sometimes they give him
discipline. Maybe they sit down and talk to them. Maybe they
take him and whip him. It's good because he knows the thing is
bad like to shoot a person or to rape a person...Sometimes I don't
feel bad because they do a wrong thing (Themba).
Once the "comrades" had identified someone who "has done a wrong thing", discipline was
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meted out. This ranged from talking to the person, to "whipping" them. "Themba" did "not
feel bad" about engaging in "disciplinary" activities because they were "showing" the offender
that their activities were "bad", and consequently unacceptable. Murder and rape were seen
to be particularly serious "crimes" against the community:
However, it was not only "talking" and "whipping" that constituted "discipline". Serious
crimes could be punishable by death. This was usually the case if the offender was perceived
as "irredeemable":
The comrades solve a problem. Other boys they don't
understand, they need help. But other boys they didn't understand
when the comrades talk, so that's why the comrades have killed
them. If a comrade tell a person what is bad and they don't
understand, she must kill them because she is going to do bad
things like killing my grandmother and stealing money from my
sisters (Thandi).
For Thandi, immoral people in the community were seen to be in need of assistance from the
"comrades" to get back on the "right path". If "wrong doers" did not learn from the words
of the comrades, violence was seen, as Zola expressed it, "another language which people
understand". The horrifying consequence that Thandi claimed was necessary for those who
"don't understand what is bad", was to kill that person. This emerged from a belief that
those who "don't understand" were likely to commit terrible crimes in the future such as
killing one's "grandmother".
Like Durkheim's repressive punishment, this "mechanical discipline" as it was termed by
these youth, was seen as pre-emptive. By killing someone, they would not be able to harm
others again. Violence was also a warning to others in the community as to what to expect
from the comrades for "wrong doings". All this needs to be seen in the light of the
inadequate and biased activities of the police and justice system historically in South Africa.27
Despite these many justifications for violence implicit in youths' discourse, this in no way
*
means that they relished being involved in acts of violence nor that they desired to do so.
Political violence was seen as a "necessary evil" toward a political end - essentially, bringing
21
meted out. This ranged from talking to the person, to "whipping" them. "Themba" did "not
feel bad" about engaging in "disciplinary" activities because they were "showing" the offender
that their activities were "bad", and consequently unacceptable. Murder and rape were seen
to be particularly serious "crimes" against the community:
However, it was not only "talking" and "whipping" that constituted "discipline". Serious
crimes could be punishable by death. This was usually the case if the offender was perceived
as "irredeemable":
The comrades solve a problem. Other boys they don't
understand, they need help. But other boys they didn't understand
when the comrades talk, so that's why the comrades have killed
them. If a comrade tell a person what is bad and they don't
understand, she must kill them because she is going to do bad
things like killing my grandmother and stealing money from my
sisters (Thandi).
For Thandi, immoral people in the community were seen to be in need of assistance from the
"comrades" to get back on the "right path". If "wrong doers" did not learn from the words
of the comrades, violence was seen, as Zola expressed it, "another language which people
understand". The horrifying consequence that Thandi claimed was necessary for those who
"don't understand what is bad", was to kill that person. This emerged from a belief that
those who "don't understand" were likely to commit terrible crimes in the future such as
killing one's "grandmother".
Like Durkheim's repressive punishment, this "mechanical discipline" as it was termed by
these youth, was seen as pre-emptive. By killing someone, they would not be able to harm
others again. Violence was also a warning to others in the community as to what to expect
from the comrades for "wrong doings". All this needs to be seen in the light of the
inadequate and biased activities of the police and justice system historically in South Africa.27
Despite these many justifications for violence implicit in youths' discourse, this in no way
means that they relished being involved in acts of violence nor that they desired to do so.
Political violence was seen as a "necessary evil" toward a political end - essentially, bringing
22
an end to apartheid or unjust rule:
I don't think the youth want to be involved in violence. Really,
it is bad and no-one mentally fit can support violence. So I don't
think youth in this country maybe enjoys or wants to be involved
in violence, but they are prepared maybe to make sure that this
violence comes to an end because it makes most of the things
they enjoy to be impossible. So this is why I'm saying that no
human being who is mentally alright can support violence. Only
those who are perpetrating it can want to see it prevailing every
day (Nika).
Political violence was seen as instrumental - it was a means for achieving political gains. The
respondent quoted above believed that violence by the state and other agents could only be
ended with oppositional political violence. Violence carried out either by the state, or by
gangsters, or "undisciplined" members of the community, prevented youth from "enjoying"
life. The above respondent believed that an enjoyment of violence indicated "mental illness"
and the enjoyment of violence was, therefore, absurd:
No one likes to fight. To fight is not to play. To fight is to fight
and maybe if you are watching, you see it is hard. So you know
that you can die. So then it is a lie if the press say that the youth
are getting happy if they can be involved in those violence. You
can only be happy if you have peace. We want peace and peace
you must fight for it (Zola).
For Zola, violence was not a game that youth "play". Not only was fighting "hard" i.e.
strenuous, but there was also a real chance of the loss of life of those close to you, your
comrades, or even to yourself. While, violence may have been accepted as an indispensable
aspect of struggle to achieve "peace", it did not make them "happy". While these young
people were engaged in a number of acts of collective violence, their engagement was part
of a broader social action aimed at a dispensation that would benefit a collective.
Consequently, collective violence in this context needs to be seen as a tactic employed by
participants in social movement organisations, and not as a broadly defined "culture of
violence" as many have chosen as an explanation.
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CONCLUSION
Collective or political was perceived by the youth concerned essentially to be reactive - "the
culture of violence amongst youth" (Lumkile) began when the security forces responded
violently to peaceful protest. But, violence was used against all who were seen to be
preventing "unity" in the townships - gangsters, Inkatha and perceived representatives of
capital.
The legitimacy that these youth gave to political violence cannot be understood without
examining the discourses they made use of which forms part of, and which illuminates, their
self-identities. Key to understanding the willingness of Diepkloof organised youth
participation in political violence is their prime identity as "comrade youth" whose role was
to protect the community from physical and moral threat. Being a comrade meant doing
anything in one's power to end apartheid and divisions in the community; this demanded the
creation of a hegemonic and united movement of opposition. These youths' discourses around
political violence are a combination of "derived ideas" advocated centrally by the ANC in the
mid-eighties in its attempt to create "ungovernability", and "people's war" and in turn by the
Charterist social movement inside the country; and the "inherent ideas" of the youth
themselves which materialised from their own experiences of the state's repressive actions,
their engagement in resistance politics, and local conditions in Diepkloof.
This discourse is complex, and became increasingly fragmented in the early nineties as the
self-identity and role of the Charterist youth movement became more and more unclear, as
did that of the Charterist movement at large. (The ANC itself was in a complicated position
of being engaged in party politics and a mass social movement simultaneously.) However,
what seems clear is that the "moral" discourse embedded in what it meant to be a "comrade",
moral defenders of the community, remained in tact while the "political" discourse was less
unified and directed in the early nineties. This needs to be seen in the context of the changed
nature of politics in South Africa in the early nineties and the consequent decline of the
organisations of the Charterist youth movement which we have witnessed since the
negotiations process, but even more so since the elections in 1994.
It may appear that the focus of this paper is historical and has little relevance for
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contemporary South Africa and the problems our society confronts. However, the
examination of the discourse used by the youth concerned provides an insight into a mode of
thought and identity which continues to prevail and, if grappled with adequately, could assist
in developing programmes that allow for real conciliation and reintegration. Township youth
in our country continue to be involved in acts of collective violence. This takes place in a
number of different forms and can be identified as a major threat to safety and security and
reconstruction and development. In many townships in South Africa, youth are organised into
defense structures such as the Self Defense Units (generally associated with the ANC) or Self
Protection Units (generally associated with Inkatha). These structures have a historical basis
and prevail as a result of youth's continued identity as "defenders of the community".
While, the apartheid state which existed prior to the Government of National Unity has ceased
to exist, a number of legitimations provided by the youth interviewed for their engagement
in acts of collective violence are likely to prevail in the consciousness of these young people.
Firstly, inequality and deprivation are still the primary experiences of youth at the local level.
The Reconstruction and Development Programme, while facing a mammoth task of
redistribution, has moved relatively slowly in addressing the problems confronted by the
majority of black South Africans. Township residents continue to exist in conditions of
extreme poverty, and the provision of proper education, and job creation is going to be a
slow and painful process. Consequently, for many young people, the only way of achieving
any "real changes", or receiving attention from the state is through their engagement in acts
of collective violence.
The sad reality we are confronted with is that the South African state has limited resources.
It is in fact when violence breaks out in local areas that attention is given, and if possible,
programmes of development constructed. The East Rand, in,.particular, Katorus, is a case
in point. When violence broke out in this area after the elections, it was deemed National
disaster area, and a large number of state resources were pumped into this locality in an
attempt to limit acts of collective violence (generally carried out by the youth). A special
reservists programme was established for militarised youth in this area by the Ministry of
Safety and Security. Special training colleges have also been developed by the Ministry of
Education in this area. This reaction on behalf of the state, while effective in the short term,
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has had a number of unintended consequences. Youth in other areas such as Soweto and the
Vaal are resentful of the special treatment given to Katorus and believe the only method of
receiving state attention is to engage in acts of collective violence. Political organisations and
the state need to acknowledge their own historical role in creating such consciousness in the
minds of youth in our country. Violence, however perceived, does bring recognition!
Furthermore, while the South African Police Service is attempting to engage in more
accountable and community defined activities, this process of change is far from complete.
In a number of areas in South Africa, for example Nyanga in the Western Cape, the Police
Service is perceived as inefficient and inadequate. In general, however, the police service
are still regarded with suspicion by township residents. This is a result of their historical
repressive and partisan activities, as well as their current inefficiency in dealing with crime
and other threats to local communities. In Orange Farm, an informal settlement in Gauteng,
for example, there is no police station and no police persons present in the area after 4pm.
The consequence of these realities is that youth who do see themselves as "defenders of the
community" are forced to play the role of an alternative police service. This in itself is
problematic since these youth are not formally trained as police personnel; in some instances,
they themselves are the perpetrators of crime and part of gang formations. Their legitimacy,
therefore, as defenders of the community, differs from one area to the next. None-the-less,
these youth derive a sense of identity and purpose through their engagement in "policing
activities", largely as a result of the fact that they have historically been marginalised from
key social activities such as employment, and education.
In conclusion, there are no easy answers to ending the problem of collective violence carried
out by youth at a local level. What is clear, however, is that whatever decisions are made
regarding programmes of development and reconstruction involving youth need to take
account of their self-perceptions and identities since these are often what shape the activities
in which they participate, as this paper has attempted to show. In the case of the youth who
align themselves to the Charterist social movement, their identities as "youth" and "comrade"
are central to their discourse and practise. Political parties, and the newly created
government were partly responsible in creating these identities. Leaders of parties concerned
and of government need to publicly state their historic role in the creation of these identities,
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and acknowledge an understanding for their continued existence. These youths conceptions
of themselves as energetic bearers of the future who need to defend the community, can be
reconstituted in positive and constructive ways in tandem with the political and social goals
of the new government. At the same time, of course, youth and local communities in general
need to be aware of the real constraints that government is confronted with in terms of
resources and competing interest groups. In the final analysis, however, young township
residents have real grievances that should be considered as a challenge, and not as a problem.
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Endnotes
L This paper is based on a Masters Thesis entitled "Organisation. Identity and Violence Amongst Activist
Diepkloof Youth, 1985-1993".
2. As a result of the high level of violence in this area where key leaders of this organisation were
assassinated in late 1991. I was advised by members of the organisation I that my attendance could
be both dangerous to myself, and could bring further attention to the organisations concerned.
Consequently, in late 1991.1 stopped attending these meetings. This, however, did not mean that I was
unable to participate broadly in the political lives of these young people.
3. Cosas was a student organisation launched in 1979 in response to the crisis in the schools. It took the
place of the Black Consciousness student organisations, which were banned after the June 1976
uprisings. However, Cosas differed significantly from the student organisations of the seventies. It
adopted the then banned Freedom Charter as its guiding document; signifying a move away from the
ideology of Black Consciousness, to that of the ANC's ideology of non-racialism. Cosas was in fact the
first organisation in South Africa to adopt the Freedom Charter since the banning of political
organisations in 1960. In 1983. Cosas was the largest affiliate of the newly formed United Democratic
Front. It was banned in 1985, and "unbanned " by its membership in 1989.
Sayco was launched in 1987 as a national federal umbrella structure of the local youth congresses.
Sayco targeted youth who were not schooling and hence could not be organised by Cosas. In reality,
however, most youth who could have been members of Cosas were organised by Sayco. Sayco
subsequently became the largest affiliate of the UDF, and was viewed by many as forwarding the
liberation movement inside South Africa. Sayco identified openly with the ANC throughout its
existence, even though it was banned.
4. All names used in the paper are fictional.
5. These youth were members of two main youth organisations in South Africa in the eighties and early
nineties, that is. the Congress of South African Students (Cosas) and the South African Youth Congress
(Sayco). Both these organisations are part of what can more broadly be defined as the Charterist
Social Movement.
According to Jeremy Seekings. "These organisations often indicated their allegiances through embracing
the Freedom Charter, which the ANC adopted in 1955. The ANC-linked movement thus became known
as Charterist. The emergent youth [from the late 1970's] comprised an important factor propelling
the growing power of the Charterist movement, which in turn shaped processes of organisation,
mobilisation and definition of the youth." Seekings. J. Heroes or Villains? Youth Politics in the 1980s.
Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1993. P. 21.
6. This paper, following the work of Tilly, makes use of the terms "collective violence" and "political
violence" interchangeably. According to Tilly, collective or political violence constitute acts of violence
carried out by members of or participants in social movements with the aim of bringing about some
form of social or political change. Collective or political violence, then, for Tilly is purposive and
rational, and forms a part of broader acts of collective action.
See C. Tilly. R. Tilly, and L. Tilly. The Rebellions Centurv: 1B30 - 1930. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press. 1975.
See Tilly. C. From Mobilisation to Revolution. New York: Random House. 1978.
See Tilly. C. "Modules and Realities of Popular Collective Action." Social Research 52. no 4 (1985).
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7. Although collective violence is viewed as rational, this does not automatically render this plausible, nor
does it mean that such collective activities are well conceived, or organised. The space is always
created in collective action for a actors with different goals to participate. This may result in a fine
line being drawn between collective violence and forms of criminal violence.
8. For the purpose of this chapter the term "discourse" will be used to mean a "fairly comprehensive and
systematically articulated ensemble of specific ways and modes of talking about particular areas of
social life either with general institutions, professions and disciplines or with certain general ideological
and political positions. They are at once discourse and social practice". This Definition is taken from
A. Du Toit. "Discourses on Political Violence." In Violence and the Struggle in South Africa ,eds. M.
Manganyi and A. Du Toit. London: MacMillan Press, (1990), p 95.
9. See A. Du Toit. ibid.
10. See S. Stanage. "Violatives: Modes and Themes of Violence." In Reason and Violence in Philosophical
Investigations, ed. S. Stanage. London: Basil Blackwell. 1974.
11. ibid., p 222.
12. The attempt to understand the relationship between the Diepkloof organised youth and political
violence, follows the premise of the work of D. Apter. "Towards a Critical Discourse on Political
Violence." In Political Violence and the Struggle in South Africa, eds. M. Manganyi and A. Du Toit.
London: MacMillan Press. 1990. Apter believes that in order to understand political violence, one needs
to understand discourses on violence and that the very involvement of participants in acts of violence
generates discourses around violence itself.
13. Phillips. 1. "The Opposition: After Kabwe and the Emergency: Lessons from the 1980's. In Political
Conflict in South Africa -Data Trends. Natal: Indicator Project South Africa, December 1988.
14. In Oliver Tambo's opening speech at the Kabwe Conference in 1985. youth were encouraged to disarm
police and steal guns from white homes. Below is an extract of his speech:
Pretoria has carried out its murderous plans to extremes. We must now respond to the
reactionary violence of the enemy with our own revolutionary violence. The weapons are
hidden there in white houses. Each white house has a gun or two hidden inside to use against
us. Our mothers work in their kitchens. We work in their gardens. We must deliberately go
out to look for these weapons in these houses. It is a matter of life and death to find these
weapons to use against the enemy... The lone policeman must be made a target. He must be
destroyed so that we can get his weapon... We must learn to lay ambushes for the armoured
personnel carriers and police cars that patrol the locations.
1 was given a copy of this tape in 1992 by one of the young activists in Diepkloof. He informed me that
this tape had been widely distributed in youth organisations. He added that this tape had become his
"gospel" as it was given to him by one of the key youth leaders from Diepkloof who was killed in late
1991 by the South African Police Force.
15. South African Youth Congress draft policy document, 1987.
16. See J. Seekings. "Quiescence and the Transformation to Confrontation: South African Townships. 1978—
1984." Ph.D thesis, Oxford University, 1990.
See also C. Tilly, L. Tilly and R. Tilly. The Rebellious Century: 1B30-1930. Cambridge: Oxford University
Press, 1975. These works propose that state repression often leads to resistance and more
confrontational forms of conflict.
It should also be kept in mind that the ANC itself for many decades believed in non-violent collective
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action as a strategy for change. This only changed with the event of Sharpeviile in I960 where 69
people were killed when peacefully protesting against the inhumane pass system, and the consequent
banning of the ANC and other liberatory organisations.
17. Straker. G. Faces in the Revolution: The Psychological Effects of Violence on Township Youth in South
Africa. Cape Town: David Phillip. 1992. p 132.
18. In a sense they had an almost Sorelian approach to violence in that for Sorel "it was not a question
of justifying violence but of understanding its role in history. For Sorel. great historic action was
inevitably marked by violence..." Cited in J. Roth. The Cult of Violence: Sorel and the Sorelians. Los
Angeles: University of California Press. 1990, p 50. Roth continues that for Sorel, violence clearly
delineated the dichotomy of the "good" and the "bad", it "boosted revolutionary morale and removed
what was seen in society as the 'mark of weakness'", p 50.
19. This sentence in itself is a direct quote from Nelson Mandela at the famous treason trial of 1964.
20. This is in accordance with the writings of D. Apter. "A View from the Bogside." In The Elusive Search
for Peace: South Africa. Israel and Northern Ireland, eds. H. Gilomee and J. Gagliano. Oxford: Oxford
University Press. 1990. Apter posits that acts of violence themselves create their own discourses in
which actual death and sacrifice are a part.
21. Straker. C,_ Faces in the Revolution: The Psychological Effects of Violence on Township Youth in South
Africa, p 98.
22. These "attributes" of youth outlined in the eighties by Sayco. In its draft policy document (1887) four
"characteristics and qualities" of youth were identified: 1) "the young and rising generation constitutes
a representative of the future in the broadest sense"; 2) "the stage of youth is one of learning and
assimilating"; 3) "the youth is enthusiastic-determined, impatient and displays great zeal and verve
in fighting for what it conceives as just"; 4) "young people can be easily swayed into positions".
23. Interview with Mr Tloteng in 1992. Tloteng was a senior social worker with Nicro in Soweto.
24. ibid., p 111.
25. According to W. Scharf and B. Ngcokoto. "Images of Punishment in the People's Courts of Cape Town.
1985-87: From Prefigurative Justice to Populist Violence." In Political Violence and the Struggle in
South Africa, eds. N. Manganyi and A. Du Toil. London: MacMillan Press, 1990. "the aim of peoples'
structures in the eighties was to "enforce a new morality, a peoples' morality that conformed to the
political ideals of their liberatory projects", p 341.
26. Draft Policy Document of the South African Youth Congress. 1987.
27. See W. Scharf and B. Ngcokoto. "Images of Punishment in the People's Courts of Cape Town. 1985-1987:
From Prefigurative Justice to Populist Violence." In Political Violence and the Struggle in South Africa.
ed. N. Manganyi and A. du Toil London: Macmillan Press, 1990. This piece explores the roots of popular
or alternative forms of justice in African townships in South Africa.
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